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I.

WHAT

Is THE "INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY"?

The days of our current communications technologies may be
numbered; according to many observers, contemporary electronic
and written media are soon to be replaced by "broadband" digital
networks carrying an array of electronic information services. 1 The
new technology promises to provide users with a broad range of
new means of receiving news and other information, of communicating, of conducting business transactions and of being
entertained.
The development of the Internet may be the harbinger of the
new communications regime. This international agglomeration of
computer networks permits virtually instant dissemination of information among users, and provides individuals with the ability to
post messages to and receive communications from thousands of
others.' The current Internet, however, which can be utilized only
by persons with the requisite access to and knowledge of computer
technology, provides only a hint of what the future might bring.
The stakes (and possibilities for changes in the nature of commerce, entertainment and communications) will increase dramatically if - as many envision - a broadband communications
t This Article was delivered at a symposium entitled Travelling the Information
Superhighway, Communications Law and Regulation in the Twenty-First Century on
November 17, 1994, at the Seton Hall University School of Law.
* Dean Emeritus, New York University School of Law; Of Counsel, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, NY.
** Associate, Wachtell, Upton, Rosen & Katz, New York, NY.
The authors would like to thank Donna M. Chambers, a summer associate at
Wachtell, Lipton, for her valuable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 See, e.g., Mitchell Kapor, Where is the DigitalHighway Really Heading? The Casefor a
Jeffersonian InformationPolicy, WIRED,July-Aug. 1993, at 53 ("The information and communication infrastructure of the future, based on fiber optics, will provide the principal conduits for global entertainment, commerce, information, and communication
in the next century."); Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the
Information Superhighway, 107 HARv. L. Rzv. 1062, 1062 (1994).
2 M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and the First Amendment, 104 YALE L.J. 1681, 1693 (1995). Contrary to popular belief, the Internet is not
a single network. "It is a collection of networks bound together by the use of a common communications protocol." Id. at 1693 n.37.
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network comes to replace and transform broadcast radio and television, cable television, telephone and even mail communications.
The development of a truly unified broadband network is
likely to transform our daily activities at home and at work in heretofore unanticipated ways. For one thing, current barriers to access to information databases and entertainment programming
may diminish dramatically. The new digital technology holds the
promise of transmitting a virtually unlimited range of materials from news and technical information to movies and novels - to
each user when and where desired. The library, as well as the
videotape rental store, may be replaced by an electronic network
3
accessible from home and the office.
Broadband network technology also promises to provide an
additional, interactive dimension unavailable in current broadcast
media. We are already becoming familiar with the electronic conduct of business communications and transactions. This trend is
bound to accelerate as electronic communications networks become increasingly sophisticated and unified. Moreover, the facilitation of communications on the "information superhighway" may
permit the users of the new networks to become the creators of
their own information and entertainment "programming." In the
view of one observer, with the advent of broadband networks,
"[e]lectronic communication will no longer be a predominantly
passive mode of interaction ....
Instead, communication will be
an interactive process conducted via two-way, multiple-format information streams controlled by users of the media."4 Thus, the distinction between the purveyor of broadcast and communications
services and the consumer of such services may become increasingly more difficult to draw.
It is nearly certain that the new communications networks will
be developed by corporate, not government, institutions. The central role of private enterprise in developing and operating the new
3 See generally Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805
(1995).
4 Allen S. Hammond, RegulatingBroadband Communication Networks, 9 YALEJ. REG.
181, 184 (1992) (emphasis added); see also Kapor, supra note 1, at 94 (discussing potential for "Jeffersonian" communications system); Bruce A. Olcott, Note, Will They
Take Away My Vzdeo-Phone If I Get Lousy Ratings? A ProposalForA "Video Common Camer"
Statute In Post-Merger Telecommunications, 94 COLuM. L. REv. 1558, 1569 (1994)
("[I)ndividuals will be able to 'produce' their own television programs, bringing us
increasingly back to the days when an individual who wanted to express a viewpoint
could mount a soapbox in the town square and compete with the wealthy and influential for attention.").
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networks has become clear over the last several years,5 and was cemented by the recent Congressional elections. The Senate and
House have both passed major telecommunications bills 6 which (if
reconciled by the two houses of Congress and signed into law)
promise to remove many regulatory barriers now preventing providers of long-distance and local telephone and cable television services from entering into each other's businesses. Thus, the new
networks are likely to be developed and owned by current communications and entertainment giants (or agglomerations thereof).'
The role of government (if any) in regulating such new communications enterprises has, however, yet to be defined. Neither have
the constitutional constraints on such regulation been identified.
Congress and the courts will have to grapple with the balance
of First Amendment interests at issue in a truly interactive communications environment in which the distinctions between audience
and broadcaster and between broadcaster as speaker and broadcaster as conduit for the speech of others are no longer clearly
defined. It is certain, however, that such novel communications
technologies will raise new constitutional and policy considerations, and challenge existing First Amendment paradigms. Predicting the range of constitutional issues to be presented in the
communications future is an uncertain science, particularly given
the as yet undefined nature and scope of the "superhighway."
Nonetheless, one can anticipate the outlines of future debates
through an examination of precedents applied to current written
and electronic media. This paper attempts to identify several areas
of speech and speech regulation that are likely to be of importance
in the new communications era: (i) the ability of government to
ensure access to the information networks; (ii) government power
to regulate the content of speech on the "superhighway"; and (iii)
protections of personal reputation and privacy on the communications networks.
II.

PROVIDING ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY

The consolidation of communications activities on privatelyowned broadband networks is certain to raise issues of public access. We can anticipate disputes concerning the rights of network
See Kapor, supra note 1, at 54; Olcott, supra note 4, at 1560.
6 See Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, S. 652,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); Communications Act of 1995, H.R. 1555, 104th Cong.
1st Sess (1995).
7 See Olcott, supra note 4, at 1560.
5
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owners to exclude or otherwise regulate the participation of other
large communications concerns, as well as small users and programmers. Central to the debate will be the power of government
to mandate access to the privately owned broadband networks. Examination of the constitutional standards applicable to current
communications technologies will not resolve the issue, because
the courts have developed differing (and arguably contradictory)
analytic schemes in evaluating government regulation of various
forms of media.' A review of the existing regulatory precedents is
instructive, however, and may provide hints of the First Amendment problems to be presented by the as yet uncharted future of
communications technologies.
A.

The Written Press

The written press stands at one end of the First Amendment
spectrum; the Supreme Court has rejected virtually all regulation
of the content of newspapers and other written publications.' The
leading case of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,'° held unconstitutional a statute granting political candidates a right to reply
to negative newspaper articles and editorials. The Court reasoned
that such a governmental mandate concerning the content of the
written media amounted to constitutionally violative compelled
speech.11
B.

Broadcast Communications

Broadcast media stand in the middle of the First Amendment
spectrum. The Court has recognized significant governmental
power to ensure third-party access to broadcast outlets, reasoning
that the scarcity of broadcast bands gives rise to a governmental
interest in ensuring a diversity of available programming."2 Thus,
in Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC,13 the Court upheld the constitu8 See generally Peter Tu, CommunicationRegulation and the FirstAmendment: A Utilitarian Model 21 (May 5, 1994) (unpublished paper).
9 See Note, supra note 1, at 1071.
10 418 U.S. 241 (1974).

11 See id. at 256-58; see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S.
1, 20-21 (1986) (finding unconstitutional mandate that utility include consumer advocacy group materials with bills sent to customers).
12 See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943).
13 395 U.S. 367 (1969). Even though Red Lion and Tornillo involved similar questions of governnment-compelled access to the media, the Tornillo Court did not even
cite Red Lion, a case reaching a directly contrary result. This evidences the Court's
differing treatment of the print and broadcast media.
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tionality of the fairness doctrine (now unenforced by the FCC),14
which required broadcasters to provide viewers and listeners with
programming reflecting a balance of political viewpoints and positions. a5 Following the Red Lion rationale, Congress has grounded
the imposition of other affirmative duties upon broadcasters, such
as the provision of children's programming, on broadcast band
16
scarcity.
C.

Common Carriers

At the other end of the regulatory spectrum stand telephone
companies. As "common carriers" under federal statute, telephone companies are required to provide access to all users on a
nondiscriminatory basis. 7 Telephone companies lack even the
power to impose time, place and manner restrictions enjoyed by
the governmental operators of facilities falling within the definition of access-protected public fora. Indeed, as the mere passive
carriers of third party communications (rather than the producers
or selectors of programming), telephone companies arguably do
not even have the status of "speakers" under the First Amendment.
D.

Cable Television

The Courts have yet fully to define the First Amendment status
of cable television, the newest of the established mass-market communications systems. And the current judicial struggle with First
Amendment issues presented by this communications medium
may provide some hint of the constitutional status of regulations of
the "information superhighway."
Like radio and television broadcasters, and unlike phone companies, the owners of cable television systems select programming
for their customers; hence, the Supreme Court has deemed cable
operators speakers, cloaked with some First Amendment protec14 See In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station WTVH
Syracuse, New York, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987) (deciding against enforcement of fairness
doctrine), affd, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).
15 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377-78. Although the Court has noted that its spectrum
scarcity rationale has come under criticism, particularly in the wake of technological
changes increasing the range of available electronic media, it has refused to overrule
the Red Lion precedent. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S.Ct. 2445,
2457 (1994); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.l1 (1984); see also
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(holding that the First Amendment did not require broadcasters to permit editorial
advertisements).
16 See Children's Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303a.
17 See Hammond, supra note 4, at 210; see also 47 U.S.C. § 202(a).
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tions. 8 The Court also recently recognized, however, that a cable
operator's role as programmer is substantially limited to the selection of programming sources. After choosing a menu of programming for its customers, a cable system typically plays the passive
role of conduit, providing an unedited stream of programming to
its customers. 19
In Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC,2" the Court rejected
the notion that government regulation of the content of cable operators' speech should be subject to the relatively relaxed standard
of review applicable in the broadcast context. The Turner Court
reasoned that the "scarcity" rationale underlying the Red Lion decision is inapplicable to cable technology, which lacks the bandwidth
limits presented by conventional television and radio communications.2 ' One might question the Turner Court's refusal to expand
application of the scarcity rationale to the cable context. The
number of cable channels available on each system is limited by
technology.22 Moreover, given that mostjurisdictions are served by
a single cable operator, viewers' cable television options are inextricably linked to the programming decisions of one company, and
thus in some ways more constrained than their broadcast communications options. 3
In any event, while the Turner Court rejected an expansion of
the Red Lion doctrine, it pragmatically recognized that the monopoly character of most cable operations may permit for speech regulations that would not be constitutionally permissible in the print
media context. Thus, the Court indicated the possible constitutionality of the "must carry" provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,4 which require
cable operators to provide their customers with access to, inter alia,
18 See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994);
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991).
19 See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2452.
20 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
21 See id. at 2457.
22 See generally Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the DemocraticHeart of the FirstAmendment in the Age of InteractiveMedia, 104 YALE

L.J. 1619, 1622 (1995) ("[G]iven a finite number of channels (even if the number is
500 or 1000), some entity will always have to make choices about who is allowed to use
a given channel.").
23 It should be noted, however, that a federal statute prohibits municipalities from
granting exclusive cable franchises, 47 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1), and the Supreme Court
has questioned whether the granting of such franchises could survive First Amendment scrutiny. See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S.
488, 495 (1986).

24 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35 (Supp. V 1993).
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certain local commercial broadcast channels 25 and certain public
service stations.2 6 The Court rested its holding on a recognition
that cable operators are the "gatekeepers" for the television programming received by the approximately 60 percent of homes now
wired for cable reception, observing that "the physical connection
between the television set and the cable network gives the cable
operator ... control over most (if not all) of the television programming that is channeled into the subscriber's home."2' 7 The
Court reasoned that Congress had a strong interest in preserving
the viability of broadcast television by ensuring broadcasters' access to the homes of cable viewers. If the facts supported the proposition that broadcasters required government regulation to
ensure their access to cable systems, and would be driven out of
business without access to cable, the Court concluded, the access
law would be valid under a middle tier scrutiny standard applicable
to content neutral speech regulations.28
E.

Access to the Superhighway

The new communications networks are bound to challenge
the foregoing categories of First Amendment analysis. The constitutional equation created by the "information superhighway" will
be far more complicated than that presented in the print, broadcast, telephone or cable contexts. The proprietors of the new communications networks are likely to be the providers of, as well as
conduits for, programming, providing information, entertainment
and other services for distribution to their customers. 29 And, as in
the cable context, competing entertainment companies and other
information providers will seek access to the new communications
networks.
In addition, if the new technology provides the means for
users to create and disseminate their own programming to others,
the new networks are bound to present novel issues related to ensuring consumers' access to the means of disseminating programming to an audience, as well as ensuring their access to a variety of
§ 534.
§ 535.
27 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2466.
28 Id. at 2469-72. Justice Stevens would have deferred to Congress' judgment and
upheld the provisions absent further factual inquiry. See id. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
29 See Hammond, supra note 4, at 189-90; Olcott, supra note 4, at 1567-70.
25 Id.

26 Id.
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programming sources. 1
The unanswered question is how legislators and courts will balance the First Amendment interests of the owners of the new communications networks against the interests of the individuals,
groups and organizations that will seek to obtain access to their
technology. At least one commentator has suggested that the Constitution would permit the institution of a common carrier statute
for the information superhighway, requiring the proprietors of networks to grant access to all who seek it. 31 The author suggests that
such a mandatory access law would withstand even a strict scrutiny
analysis, on the ground that no reasonable alternative means of
communications would be available to speakers denied access to
the new communications networks.3 2
Another commentator has suggested that the new networks although not government-owned facilities - might be made subject to regulations guaranteeing to users access on much the same
terms as the First Amendment provides to limited public fora. 3
This notion is supported in part by the Supreme Court's decision
in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 34 which upheld a statute requiring a privately owned shopping mall to provide picketers with
access to its facilities on a nondiscriminatory basis, subject only to
time, place and manner restrictions.3 5
Neither the common carrier nor the state-mandated forum access proposals, however, appear fully to recognize network owners'
status as speakers, as well as their status as conduits for the speech
of others. The proprietors of the networks are bound to argue that
denying them the power to exclude others from their systems or
regulate the content of speech thereon would obviate a fundamen30 See Berman & Weitzner, supra note 22, at 1632 (discussing possibility of "usercontrolled" interactive media).
31 See Olcott, supra note 4, at 1611.
32 See id. at 1615-16.
33 See Message in the Medium, supra note 1, at 1092-93.

34 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
35 See id. at 88. It should be noted that any such regulation might be vulnerable to
a Fifth Amendment takings challenge. Unlike the mall at issue in PruneYard, which
had been held open to the public, a computer network operator may seek to limit
access to paying customers. Thus, government-compelled access might be held to
compromise the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations, requiring compensation from either the government or media users. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (government-compelled access to private marina
required compensation). For a recent discussion of potential applications of public
forum doctrine to the emerging 'information superhighway,' see David J. Goldstone,
The Public Forum In The Age of The Information Superhighway (Where Are The Public Forums
On The Information Superhighway?), 46 HASTINGS L.J. 335 (1995).

1454

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:1446

tal right they enjoy as speakers: that is, their right not to speak. 6
The response to this objection might be that the role of network
forum operators as speakers - i.e., as the creators and disseminators of programming - should be distinguished from their role as
the operators of communications systems. That is, network operators should be free to create and disseminate their own programming and information on the systems they own without third party
interference or participation. But, in their role as system proprietors, they should not be viewed as editors, but rather as utility operators (like current phone companies) with the obligation to
provide access to their facilities on a nondiscriminatory basis.
It remains to be seen whether the courts will be amenable to
an analytic scheme that draws a constitutional distinction between
the role of a communications network owner as information provider and its proprietary role as a conduit for the speech of
others, 7 deeming the same entity a speaker for one purpose and
not the other.3" The precedents, however, do not preclude such a
multifaceted regulatory strategy. Indeed, Justice O'Connor discussed such a strategy in her Turner dissent, suggesting that a portion of the cable spectrum be set aside to be filled by a lottery or
other random method.3 9
III.

GovERNMENTr's PowR TO LIMIT SPEECH

First Amendment issues will also arise if government regulators seek to police the content of speech on the information super36 In this regard, even one commentator arguing in favor of the permissibility of
PruneYard-type regulation has observed:
[T] he information superhighway owner will be a more credible claimant of First Amendment rights than the mall owner. To guarantee access to others for the purpose of communication would potentially
interfere with the superhighway owner's ability to get its message across,
whereas allowing speakers into a mall does not directly encroach on the
mall owner's business of selling goods. In this respect, PruneYard may
appear to be less apt than [Tornillo] ....
Message in the Medium, supra note 1, at 1092 (footnotes omitted).
37 See id. at 1091-92.
38 An alternative argument might be drawn from the reasoning of Turner. While a
network provider would be deemed a speaker when functioning in its proprietary
role, its monopoly status might give rise to a sufficient governmental interest in providing public access to overcome the proprietor's First Amendment interest in asserting editorial control.
39 See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2480 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also CR Sunnstein, The FirstAmendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1798 (1995) (discussing Justice O'Connor's lottery idea and related "open channel" concept).
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highway. In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,' the Supreme Court
permitted limited government regulation of the broadcast of indecent material on the radio, reasoning that the broadcast media
have a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of Americans. The
Court emphasized that one cannot avoid encountering the
messages broadcast on radio and television, and that the particular
message at issue ("seven dirty words") was broadcast during hours
when it could readily be heard by children.
The Supreme Court has, however, rejected application of this
"pervasiveness" rationale to permit the banning of non-obscene
but indecent speech on certain "dial-a-porn" telephone services.4 1
The Court reasoned that the audience must choose to receive a
"dial it" call, and thus cannot be taken by surprise by the indecent
message.4 2 The pervasiveness rationale similarly has been rejected
in the cable context. 43 The courts have reasoned that the cable
box is an "invited guest" in the home.
Courts are unlikely to be receptive to any government attempt
to censor or otherwise limit the content of speech on the new information networks on decency grounds. Given that individuals
will choose which information sources to "invite" into their homes,
there will be little room for government to act as a protector of the
sensibilities of network users or their children. Also, the extensive
menu of programming that will be available makes the "scarcity"
rationale unavailable.
It seems possible that this issue may be put to an early judicial
test. A provision of the telecommunications bill recently passed by
the Senate criminalizes, among other things, certain "indecent"
40 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
41 Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (ruling
upon constitutionality of amendment to § 223(b) of the Communications Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 100-297, § 6101, 102 Stat. 130, 424 (1988)); see also Message in the
Medium, supra note 1, at 1080; Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105,
123-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (upholding statute requiring cable television operators to segregate and, absent a subscriber's written request to the contrary, block
indecent leased access programming), petitionfor cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3070 (U.S.July
21, 1995).
42 See Sable Communications,492 U.S. at 131. The Court did recognize a compelling
state interest in protecting minors from indecent materials, but held that the statute
at issue was not drawn sufficiently narrowly solely to serve this permissible interest. An
amendment to the statute requiring age verification of users of "dial-a-porn" services
has been upheld by a federal court of appeals. See Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh,
938 F.2d 1535, 1541-42 (2d Cir. 1991) (reversing grant of preliminary injunction
against enforcement of statute), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1072 (1992).
43 See generally Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2457; Message in the Medium, supra note 1, at
1079-80.
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communications on the Internet. 44
Another significant question posed by the new communications technology is the proper governmental scheme for regulating
obscene speech in an "electronic community." In one recent case,
pornographic material was placed on a computer bulletin board in
California and accessed by an Internet user in Memphis, Tennessee. The operators of the bulletin board were charged with and
convicted of criminal obscenity violations. 45 The materials at issue
were deemed obscene under the local community standards of
Tennessee.4 6 One commentator has suggested that the standards
of the "electronic community" of cyberspace users, rather than the
physical community in which each individual user resides, should
usually apply in such cases.4 7
Courts may also have to grapple with the regulation of communications on the electronic superhighway that advocate illegal
conduct. This issue has arisen recently in connection with the use
of the Internet as an organizational and communications tool by
anti-government militias. Existing Supreme Court precedents read restrictively - preclude the regulation of speech advocating
illegal activity absent the demonstration of a risk of "imminent"
wrongdoing accompanied by words of incitement. 48 However, it
may be difficult to establish such a risk of imminent harm arising
from the electronic advocacy of criminal acts. It may be next to
impossible to establish how the potentially vast, but anonymous,
audience for a communication soliciting illegal conduct is likely to
respond. Thus, communications such as the posting of bomb-making instructions on the Internet during the weeks prior to the
44 S. 652, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 410 (1995). An amendment to the House bill,
however, would prevent such regulation. 141 CONG. REc. H8460, H8468 (daily ed.
Aug 4, 1995).
45 United States v. Thomas, CR-94-20019-G (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 1994) (conviction and forfeiture order), appeals docketed, No. 94-6648, -6649 (6th Cir. Dec. 21,
1994).
46 Anne W. Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the
First Amendment inCyberspace, 104 YAL. L.J. 1639, 1652 (1995).
47 See id. Professor Branscomb argues that, unless electronic communications have
an impact upon a particular "geographical jurisdiction" (for example, if local children are improperly granted access to obscene materials) "libertarian philosophy"
would maintain that "virtual community" standards should apply. See id. at 1153-54. It
is important to note, however, that obscenity law is decidedly anti-libertarian, insofar
as it criminalizes the obtaining of certain communications, without regard to whether
the communications cause demonstrable harm to the community.
48 See generallyBrandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (criminal punishment permissible only upon showing that "advocacy [of unlawful action] is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce
such action").
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Oklahoma City bombing might fall outside of the government's
regulatory power. On the other hand, the courts may find that
current First Amendment doctrine, fashioned to some extent as a
reaction to the McCarthy era, must be modified to take into account the transformation of communications technology.
IV.

REPUTATION AND PRIVACY

The distribution of vast amounts of information on the new
"superhighway" is bound to give rise to allegations of reputational
injury and invasions of privacy, thus presenting new constitutional
and policy challenges. The blurring of the distinction between
broadcaster and audience will create practical and doctrinal
problems if individuals bring suit for defamation through electronic network communications. Moreover, the increasing conduct of communications and transactions on the new
communications networks is bound to raise concerns about personal privacy.
A.

Network Communications and Defamation Law

In an interactive environment, virtually any user will have the
means to broadcast statements - including defamatory statements
to a vast audience without the mediating filter of an editor or
television programmer. Rather than sharing their views among
small groups of people, individuals will be free to communicate
their views to the world. Moreover, the decentralization and ease
of communication on the "superhighway" may make it difficult
even to identify the sources of defamatory statements, let alone successfully to prosecute actions against them.
An important issue will be whether the party that distributes
the message, i.e., a company that maintains a broadband network,
is liable as the "publisher" of a defamatory statement.4 9 The limited case law existing in this area - developing from communications on databases such as computer bulletin boards is
somewhat divided.5 ° A pending $200 million libel suit against a
computer bulletin board provider, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co.5 1 is likely to be a test case in this developing area of libel
49 Such companies may seek the First Amendment benefits of status as "speakers,"
but be unwilling to accept responsibility for defamations that are communicated on
their systems.
50 See Daniel Waggoner, Potholeson the InformationSuperhighway, in MULTIMEDIA AND
THE LAw: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND LITERARY PROPERTY (Practicing Law

Institute Mar.-Apr. 1994).
51 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (unpublished opinion).
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law. The trial court recently rejected defendant Prodigy's claim
that it could not be liable for alleged defamatory statements transmitted on its system because it served as a mere passive conduit for
the communications of its users. The court focused on the fact
that Prodigy had established editorial standards for communications on its network, and appointed "board leaders" to ensure conformity with those standards. 2 A different court rejected a
defamation claim against another computer bulletin board operator, reasoning that the defendant did not exercise editorial control
over, or have notice of, the content of allegedly defamatory communications carried on its network.5" The divergent results in
these cases suggest a network operator will undertake substantial
liability risks if it chooses to play any role in policing the content of
communications on its system.
One suggestion for insulating the system operator would preclude defamation liability if the proprietor provides a right-of-reply
on its system to allegedly defamed parties.5" However, adoption of
this notion would require a significant change in current doctrine.
Surely, existing common law rules, which would treat system
operators as either speakers or neutral conduits for the speech of
others, are ill-suited to dealing with the consequences of widespread dissemination of defamatory messages through new communications technologies. A legislative solution that would limit
the defamation tort remedy to situations where a system operator
exercises specific types of editorial control is clearly preferable.
B.

Network Communications and the Threat to Privacy

The new information and communications technologies are
bound to create new personal privacy concerns.
For example, privacy issues are likely to arise in connection
with the "overhearing" of electronic conversations on the new networks, whether by government or private entities. It is arguable
that electronic mail and other new communications technologies
should be protected from interception to the same degree that
55
conventional telephone communications are protected today.
52 1995 WL 323710, at * 6. The court recently agreed to consider rehearing its
decision. See Prodigy's Next Chance, INFO. WK., Aug. 7, 1995, at 22.
53 See Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
54 See Branscomb, supra note 46, at 1671-72.
55 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (discussing Fourth Amendment
privacy interest in telephone conversations); 18 U.S.C. 2510 et. seq. (regulating, inter
alia, government interceptions of telephone conversations).
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Courts have, however, often been unreceptive to such arguments.5 6
A statute passed by the last Congress 57 imposes some new limitations upon governmental and private interception of electronic
communications, including protecting cellular telephone communications. 58 However, the statute includes a number of exceptions,
most notably providing no protection for communications on systems "configured so that electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public."5 9 It is conceivable that any
communications network providing bulletin board or conferencing services might fit within this exception.
It is obvious that legislatures will continue to be challenged to
draw boundaries between protected private and public communi-

cations on new information networks that blur the line between
public and personal electronic space.
CONCLUSION

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the rapidly changing nature of communications technology will pose a multitude of
constitutional and policy problems relating to freedom of speech
and expression. The challenge for courts and legislatures will be to
recognize and define the rights and responsibilities of both those
who own and those who utilize the new "superhighway."

56 See, e.g., In re Askin, 47 F.3d 100, 103 (4th Cir. 1995). The court in Askin held
that a warrantless interception of a cordless telephone conversation did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.
57 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108
Stat. 4279 (1994).
58 See id. § 202 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2510). The statute also includes some protections for transactional communications, such as electronic mail. See id. § 207
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 2703). Several states have also enacted statutes limiting both
governmental and private interceptions of electronic communications. See, e.g., Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 200.620 (1995) (Nevada statute prohibiting interception of certain wire
communications); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5703 (1995) (Pennsylvania statute prohibiting intentional interception of, inter alia, certain wire communications); Ga. Code
Ann. § 16-11-62, 64 (1995) (Georgia statute prohibiting interception of certain "private conversation [s]"); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-66.1 (1995) (Georgia Statute prohibiting interception of certain cellular telephone communications).
59 18 U.S.C. 2511(g)(i).

